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Murky Water: What Really Is Taxed as
Court Costs in North Carolina?*
Admittedly, the current status of our common law breeds much confusion
for the bench and bar regarding something seemingly as simple as what
constitutes a "cost." Regrettably, our opinion may contribute to the confu-
sion. Barring intervention by our General Assembly or Supreme Court,
the law of costs will remain unclear. 1
I. THE PROBLEM
What is taxed as court costs? A question so seemingly simple
would rightfully lead one to believe it held an answer just as basic.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as "[tihe charges or fees taxed
by the court, such as filing fees, jury fees, courthouse fees, and
reporter fees,"2 a definition which does nothing to resolve the uncer-
tainty surrounding the topic, especially in the State of North Carolina.
The statutes involved appear straightforward, and the use of common
principles of statutory interpretation indicate that the "answer" is clear
as well-one which would not only clarify the law but also allow for
consistent application in the majority of cases that implicate the issue.3
Unfortunately, case law in North Carolina has only muddled the prob-
lem, as the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and various trial courts
in the state, have taken two divergent options interpreting various
cases dealing with costs, rarely attempting to provide any coherent
framework for consistency or clarification. "What constitutes 'costs'?"
is a question that is in dire need of conclusive resolution by the
supreme court, especially in light of recent case law and legislative
amendments to controlling statutes.
There are two conflicting lines of reasoning utilized by the courts
in our state. One holds that any "reasonable and necessary" expense
may be considered a cost. 4 The other, the "explicitly delineated"
approach, appears to operate almost wholly contrary to the discretion-
* The author would like to thank the Honorable John C. Martin for inspiring him
to pursue this Comment.
1. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
786-87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
2. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 6-18, 6-19, 6-20, 7A-305(d) (2007).
4. Minton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 513, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
("We must look to the provisos of section 6-20, which vests the trial judge with discre-
tionary authority to allow costs as justice may require.").
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laden "reasonable and necessary" view.5 Under the "explicitly deline-
ated" approach, only those items that are explicitly stated in statutes or
recognized by existing common law constitute costs-clearly an
approach that heavily curtails the discretion of trial judges.6
This Comment, after discussing the applicable statutes, will ana-
lyze the aforementioned opposing lines of opinion that have evolved
and then delve deeper into what specific costs have ordinarily been
encompassed under each approach. The next portion will involve a
discussion of the impact of these alternative approaches, including a
look at their inherent positives and negatives. This discussion will also
illustrate what the future holds in light of recent relevant case law and
statutory amendments, and will address why one approach has been
utilized over the other in certain circumstances. Finally, this Com-
ment will attempt to reconcile the differing opinions on the topic and
will propose a solution that centrally focuses on consistency, helping
to end the confusion once and for all.
Until this issue is conclusively settled, the legal community and
those involved in civil suits in North Carolina will continue to walk on
thin ice, never fully knowing what a particular court will deem "costs"
to be in a given action. 7 The reader of this Comment will attain a bet-
ter understanding not only of the current state of North Carolina law
surrounding this issue, but also of why a swift resolution of the court
costs issue is so imperative. The reader will also be able to appreciate
why the issue of costs has lead some to exclaim, "Where's the
aspirin! "'8
II. THE LAW
Before undertaking a discussion into the competing approaches to
defining court costs, it is important first to set forth the law that "con-
trols" the issue at hand, because the law is what has created these
divergent approaches. By looking at the relevant statutes, one is able
5. Wade v. Wade, 325 S.E.2d 260, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("While the trial
court has broad discretion to allow costs, it may exercise that discretion only within
the bounds of its statutory authority." (citations omitted)).
6. Crist v. Crist, 550 S.E.2d 260, 264-65 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("[A] trial court...
is prohibited from assessing costs in civil cases which are neither enumerated in sec-
tion 7A-305 nor 'provided by law."' (quoting Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 500 S.E.2d 732,
739 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 519 S.E.2d 308 (N.C. 1999)).
7. Joe Wall, "Assessable Costs" in Civil Actions- Has the Court of Appeals Overruled
the Supreme Court and the Legislature?, THE LITIGATOR, Apr. 2002, at 7-8, 10 ("In the
absence of guidance from our highest court, the Court of Appeals has gone its own
way in deciding 'costs' issues.").
8. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 32:127
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to attain a better understanding of how the problem of "what consti-
tutes 'costs'?" arose, and also how the two different lines of interpreta-
tion gained their authority.
The first statute encountered is section 6-1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which states that "costs shall be allowed as provided
in Chapter 7A and this Chapter."9 Those who follow the "reasonable
and necessary" approach generally derive their authority from section
6-20, which states that in those actions where costs are not explicitly
stated by the General Statutes, "costs may be allowed in the discretion
of the court."10 Courts that have adopted this approach interpret the
use of the term "discretion" to include not only the ability to determine
whether to assess costs generally, but also specifically which costs are
assessable. 1 The ability to invoke costs under this method of analysis
"as justice may require" is what affords trial judges such expansive
discretion, and is therefore a very powerful tool for those faced with a
given cost to utilize. 2
In 2007, the North Carolina Legislature finally spoke on the issue
of costs after many years of silence.' 3 Effective August 1, 2007, sec-
tion 6-20 was amended to its current reading.' 4 While the implica-
tions of these changes have not been discussed in depth by a panel of
the North Carolina Court of Appeals (as many cases discussed in this
Comment were brought before the amendment took place), only time
will tell whether the problem is finally solved. One can forecast the
impact that the changes in these statutes will have on the costs analysis
in North Carolina.' 5 Yet a deeper look into section 6-20 (and later
section 7A-305(d)) is pivotal to understanding of the issue.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-1 (2007).
10. Minton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 513, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
("While case law has found that deposition costs are allowable under section 6-20, it
has in no way precluded the trial court from taxing other costs that may be 'reasonable
and necessary."').
11. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
783-85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing generally the "reasonable and necessary" line
of cases).
12. Minton, 468 S.E.2d at 516 ("We must look to the provisos of section 6-20,
which vests the trial judge with discretionary authority to allow costs as justice may
require.").
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d).
14. See Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 212, sec. 2, § 6-20, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 339, 339.
15. See, e.g., Fred Horlbeck, From DA Vacancies to DWI: New Laws in N.C. Cover
Wide Range, N.C. LAw. WKLY., July 30, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 26767114 (stat-
ing that the amendments to sections 6-19 and 6-20 expanded the discretion of the
courts).
129
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The old version of section 6-20 read: "In other actions, costs may
be allowed or not, in the discretion of the court, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law."16 This text led many courts to consider themselves
charged with two functionally distinct types of discretion: first, discre-
tion as whether to tax any costs at all, and second, discretion as to
what costs to tax. 17 After the amendment, the statute now reads:
In actions where allowance of costs is not otherwise provided by the
General Statutes, costs may be allowed in the discretion of the court.
Costs awarded by the court are subject to the limitations on assessable
or recoverable costs set forth in [section] 7A-305(d), unless specifically
provided for otherwise in the General Statutes. 18
As is evident, the new statute severely curtails the power and basis
of courts adhering to the "reasonable and necessary" line of reasoning
by expressly limiting their power to assess costs to those situations
where the costs are explicitly delineated in the North Carolina General
Statutes. 19
Courts which adhere to the "explicitly delineated" line interpret
"discretion" to indicate the ability of a trial judge to assess or not
assess costs-but not to define them-in a given case.20 Section 7A-
320 purports to delimit recoverable costs, stating that the costs set
forth in Article 7 (including section 7A-305(d)) "are complete and
exclusive, and in lieu of any other costs and fees."'2 ' The method of
interpretation that the courts utilize in this line of reasoning focuses
on the "plain meaning" of section 7A-305(d), which would appear to
16. Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 212, sec. 2, § 6-20, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 339, 339.
17. The court of appeals has explained that it reads section 6-20 as
conferring two different kinds of discretion: (1) the discretion to determine
whether costs should be awarded where no statute mandates an award of
costs in a particular civil action, and (2) the discretion to determine whether
an expense may be taxed as a cost notwithstanding the fact that such an
expense is not listed in [section] 7A-305(d).
Cosentino v. Weeks, 586 S.E.2d 787, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d).
19. Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 663 S.E.2d 351, 352 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
("We note that the legislature amended [sections] 6-20 and 7A-305(d), effective 1
August 2007, in such a manner that th[e] three step analysis [of Lord v. Customized
Consulting Specialty, Inc., 596 S.E.2d 891 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004),] will likely be
defunct.").
20. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
784 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("The trial court may not, however, assess as costs any
expenses which are neither enumerated within Article 28 nor 'provided by law."').
21. Morgan v. Steiner, 619 S.E.2d 516, 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
130 [Vol. 32:127
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dictate that only those items clearly listed in subsection (d) or pro-
vided by other law may be assessed as costs. 22
Before the current version of section 7A-305(d) was implemented,
the previous version of the statute read: "The following expenses, when
incurred, are also assessable or recoverable, as the case may be." 23
Looking at the change from the previous statute to the present one, the
"complete and exclusive" language takes on new meaning: it appears
that the new language is intended to seriously curtail the discretion
that many courts exercised in the past. This conclusion is solidified
not only by the exclusion of the modifier "also," but also in the lan-
guage that follows the clause: those expenses set forth "constitute a
limit on the trial court's discretion to tax costs pursuant to [section] 6-
20 .... *"24 The present version of section 7A-305(d) delineates eleven
"assessable" costs which may be taxed in certain civil actions, provid-
ing a laundry list for courts to use. 21 Subsection (e) states that noth-
ing in subsection (d) "shall affect the liability of the respective parties
22. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "It is elementary that
the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which
the act is framed, and if that is plain ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." Id. at 485. And if a statute's language is plain and clear, the
court further warned that "the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Id.
23. See Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 212, sec. 3, § 7A-305(d), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 339,
339.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d) (2007).
25. These assessable costs are:
(1) Witness fees, as provided by law.
(2) Jail fees, as provided by law.
(3) Counsel fees, as provided by law.
(4) Expense of service of process by certified mail and by publication.
(5) Costs on appeal to the superior court, or to the appellate division, as
the case may be, of the original transcript of testimony, if any, insofar as
essential to the appeal.
(6) Fees for personal service and civil process and other sheriffs fees, as
provided by law. ...
(7) Fees of mediators appointed by the court, mediators agreed upon by
the parties ....
(8) Fees of interpreters, when authorized and approved by the court.
(9) Premiums for surety bonds for prosecution, as authorized by [sec-
tion] 1-109.
(10) Reasonable and necessary expenses for stenographic and vide-
ographic assistance directly related to the taking of depositions and for the
cost of deposition transcripts.
(11) Reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual
time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings.
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for costs as provided by law."'26 Those who adhere to the "explicitly
delineated" approach rely on the "complete and exclusive" language of
section 7A-305(d) as their basis for taxing costs, 2 7 construing "costs"
as stated in section 6-20 to mean only those delineated in section 7A-
305(d).28
While one may wonder if this amendment has resolved the issue
of costs, questions still remain for those costs which have been allowed
in past court cases under the "reasonable and necessary" line of
authority: (1) do they constitute common law costs under North Caro-
lina jurisprudence, 29 (2) have those cases been overruled in whole,
and (3) is the "reasonable and necessary" approach still viable?30 A
discussion of this statutory change and its implications will fuel this
article.
Undoubtedly the statutory changes help answer some of the ques-
tions courts in the past have dealt with, but new problems still arise in
light of the recent amendments. Most importantly, the question arises
as to what courts should do with the old analytical framework as set
forth in Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc. In that case, the
court was confronted with an issue of first impression regarding a
third party defendant's ability to recover various costs under Rule
41(d).3' In dealing with the question before it, the court stated the
following three-step process to determine what costs were assessable
under the old statute:
First, if the costs are items provided as costs under [section] 7A-305,
then the trial court is required to assess these items as costs. Second,
for items not costs under [section] 7A-305, it must be determined if
they are "common law costs" under the rationale of Charlotte Area.
Third, as to "common law costs" we must determine if the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding or denying these costs under [sec-
tion] 6-20.32
26. Id. § 7A-305(e).
27. Wade v. Wade, 325 S.E.2d 260, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (providing that
"[closts are awarded only pursuant to statutory authority").
28. Crist v. Crist, 550 S.E.2d 260, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
"[a]ssessable costs in civil cases, however, are limited to those items listed in section
7A-305").
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(e).
30. Id. § 6-20.
31. Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 596 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004).
32. Id. (referencing Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc.,
586 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)) (discussing copy expenses, telephone
charges, expert witness fees, deposition and deposition related fees, and mediator
fees).
[Vol. 32:127
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While this method of analysis arguably is no longer valid in a large
number of cases due to the 2007 changes to section 7A-305(d), 33 it is
still applicable in all cases before courts that involve claims brought
prior to the adoption of the amendments or in those cases which the
statute of limitations has not run.34 The question still remains as to
how courts should analyze the problem under the current statutory
framework.
Another problem stemming from the divergence of the opinions
from various cases before the court of appeals deals with the abuse of
discretion standard of review. 35 An abuse of discretion is found in
situations where the court's action is "manifestly unsupported by rea-
son"-which is an almost impossible finding given the differing lines
of authority in the court costs area.36 Such a deferential standard of
review, once afforded, means that the trial court (especially when con-
sidering that the two choices are based on the "law") has the ability to
virtually insulate its decision, regardless of which line is chosen.37 In
light of the recent changes in the law, however, this safeguard too may
be on the wane.
III. THE CHOICES
As stated, there are two approaches that have been adopted by
courts in our state, both of which are arguably based on law and
which should inform our resolution of the issue. This section of the
discussion will give background information for each option, the cases
which have delineated each, what costs "normally" are analyzed under
33. Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 663 S.E.2d 351, 352 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(recognizing that the previous "three step analysis will likely be defunct" due to the
legislative amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d)).
34. Vaden v. Dombrowski, 653 S.E.2d 543, 546 n.3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) ("Effective
1 August 2007 the General Assembly addressed the inconsistencies within our case
law by providing that [section] 7A-305 is a "complete and exclusive . .. limit on the
trial court's discretion to tax costs pursuant to [section] 6-20." (citations omitted)).
35. See Lewis v. Setty, 537 S.E.2d 505, 507 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("The trial court's
discretion to tax costs pursuant to [section] 6-20 is not reviewable on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion."); see also Coffman v. Roberson, 571 S.E.2d 255, 261 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002); Estate of Smith ex rel. Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 815 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1997); Minton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 513, 516 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996).
36. Blankenship v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 132, 134 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002).
37. See, e.g., Minton, 468 S.E.2d at 517 (emphasizing that the judge who ruled on
the costs at the trial court was also the judge ruling over the "underlying, substantive
action," which put him in an "excellent position to assess the reasonableness and
necessity of the depositions taken").
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both approaches, and also those costs which could be granted under
one of the approaches (if not both). Subsection A discusses the "rea-
sonable and necessary" approach, and is followed by a discussion of
the "explicitly delineated" approach in subsection B.
A. The Reasonable and Necessary Approach
The "reasonable and necessary" approach is characterized by its
committing the costs question to the almost absolute discretion of the
trial judge, as a trial court's decision to tax costs under section 6-20 is
reviewed under merely an abuse of discretion standard. 38 Many cases
in the past have adhered to and adopted this approach, due in part to
the interpretation that some expenses which are not provided for by
statute may nevertheless "be considered as part of 'costs' and taxed in
the trial court's discretion. 39
A recent court of appeals opinion provides an example of this
approach. At issue in Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc. were
copy, telephone, and deposition-related expenses-costs which were
not expressly encompassed by section 7A-305(d).4 ° Citing several
cases which incorporated the "reasonable and necessary" approach,
the court of appeals utilized this relaxed interpretation of section 6-20
to classify these contested expenses as costs.4 1
A surprising array of expenses which are not explicitly referenced
in any North Carolina statute have been assessed against losing liti-
gants as court costs using the "reasonable and necessary" approach.
Examples include deposition costs, 42 trial exhibits and travel expenses
for hearings and trial,43 bond premiums in an ejectment action,44
expert witness fees for multiple testimony aimed at proving the same
facts, 45 charges by expert witnesses for time spent outside of litiga-
38. Lewis, 537 S.E.2d at 507.
39. Alsup v. Pitman, 390 S.E.2d 750, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("Even though dep-
osition expenses do not appear expressly in the statutes they may be considered as
part of 'costs' and taxed in the trial court's discretion."); see also Dixon, Odom & Co.
v. Sledge, 296 S.E.2d 512, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
40. 596 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
41. Id. ("These cost items are not allowed under [section] 7A-305(d). However,
Cosentino holds that this cost item may be taxed to a plaintiff who dismisses under
Rule 41(a) in the discretion of the trial court.") (discussing Cosentino v. Weeks, 586
S.E.2d 787 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
42. Alsup, 390 S.E.2d 750 (1990).
43. Coffman v. Roberson, 571 S.E.2d 255, 261-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
44. Minton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 513, 515-16 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996).
45. Brown v. Flowe, 496 S.E.2d 830, 834-36 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
[Vol. 32:127
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tion,46 and even costs of prior appeals.47 Through these sorts of deci-
sions, the common law of costs has become greatly expanded and
complex, creating confusion as to what now constitutes costs in a
given action. Meanwhile, of course, all costs actually listed in section
7A-305(d) can be taxed to a party, although the decision to do so
remains in the discretion of the trial judge.48
As is evident, the use of the "reasonable and necessary" method of
interpretation leads to many costs being granted almost solely based
upon trial courts' conviction that they have been endowed with "an
abundance of discretion, rather than none, 49 or simply upon what
costs seem fair to assess against a party.50 Prior to the amendment of
section 7A-305(d), 5 ' these exercises of discretion may not have been so
far-fetched, as many courts were under the impression that then-cur-
rent law gave them discretion to lump together most expenses as
costs.5 2 The obvious advantage of the "reasonable and necessary"
approach is that it is able to adapt fluidly to changes in any area of law
affecting costs, whether foreseen or unforeseen (such as new,
unenumerated expenses incurred by litigants making use of technolog-
ical or other innovations, or unintended statutory inadequacies or
complications). Countervailing concerns over this approach include
its basis in questionable principles of statutory construction and its
inconsistent application, as extra-statutory principles of reasonable-
ness and necessity can lead to results based on ad hoc determinations.
46. Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., 352 S.E.2d 902, 910 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987).
47. Lewis v. Setty, 537 S.E.2d 505, 506 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
48. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
783 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("[Slince the enumerated costs [for expert witnesses, discov-
ery, subpoena charges, transcript costs, the cost of reproducing documents for use at
trial as exhibits, and miscellaneous postage charges] sought by plaintiffs are not
expressly provided for by law, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to
award them .... ); see also Smith v. Cregan, 632 S.E.2d 206, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
("The plain language of section 7A-305(d) makes the items it sets forth 'assessable or
recoverable.' Accordingly, nothing in section 7A-305 requires a trial court to exercise
its discretion under section 6-20 to award the items listed in section 7A-305(d).").
49. Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 663 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
50. Cf. City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d 179, 185 (N.C. 1972) (negating
the notion that courts have power to assess costs "against anyone on mere equitable or
moral grounds").
51. See supra notes 23-24, 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing section 7A-
305(d) before the 2007 amendments).
52. Id.
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B. The Explicitly Delineated Approach
The "explicitly delineated" approach is one rooted more convinc-
ingly in statutory interpretation, as it derives its authority from the
plain meaning of the relevant statutes, the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,5 3 and also the "paramount precedent established
by the Supreme Court. '54 As the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has held, and courts who adopt this method quoted, "[closts, in this
State, are entirely creatures of legislation, and without this they do not
exist. '55 In addition to this definitive statement by our state's highest
court, Justice Sharp in City of Charlotte v. McNeely also stated, "[s]ince
the right to tax costs did not exist at common law and costs are con-
sidered penal in their nature, '[statutes] relating to costs are strictly
construed.' ''5 6 It therefore appears as if, applying precedent and the
principles of statutory interpretation, the law should be clear.57 This,
however, has not been the case.
Under the "explicitly delineated" theory, costs should be limited
to those which appear in the North Carolina General Statutes, or
which constitute costs previously recognized by the common law.58
Common law costs have recently been construed to encompass those
costs "established by case law prior to the enactment of [section] 7A-
320 in 1983.""9 Under this interpretation, the costs listed in section
7A-305(d) constitute mandatory costs, and are required to be assessed
if implicated in an action. 60 While this seems simple enough in appli-
53. See Evans v. Diaz, 430 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
54. Smith v. Cregan, 632 S.E.2d 206, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that
Department of Transportation v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Housing, Inc., 586 S.E.2d
780 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), applied "the paramount precedent established by the
Supreme Court" when it refused to "recognize the non-statutory expenses which had
been subsequently created by this Court").
55. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Clerk's Office v. Comm'rs of Carteret
County, 27 S.E. 1003, 1003 (N.C. 1897)).
56. Id. at 186 (quoting 20 Am. JUR. 2D Costs § 8 (1965)).
57. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., 586 S.E.2d at 786 ("We conclude that our
duty is to follow the rule established by the Supreme Court in McNeely and this
Court's "explicitly delineated" cases, which generally adhere to that rule.").
58. Id. at 784 ("Other cases from this Court have strictly limited the trial court's
authority to award costs to those items (1) specifically enumerated in the statutes, or
(2) recognized by existing common law.").
59. Morgan v. Steiner, 619 S.E.2d 516, 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Lord v.
Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 596 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)).
60. Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 663 S.E.2d 351, 353 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
("[W]e must determine whether the cost sought is one enumerated in [section] 7A-
305(d); if so, the trial court is required to assess the item as costs." (quoting Miller v.
Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 838, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005))). But see Smith,
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cation, some costs present quirky problems, because even though they
are explicitly delineated, one must also determine whether they are
assessable "as provided by law,"'" which requires an analysis of other
costs statutes as well as the common law of costs. 62 This interpreta-
tion runs contrary to the understanding of the "reasonable and neces-
sary" approach, which has still been noted as analytically "sound" by
those who disagree with its ultimate conclusion, a factor that only
helps in furthering the confusion. 63
Many costs have been denied using this approach, heeding the
words of Justice Sharp in McNeely. Examples include taxing of travel
expenses,64 x-ray films and copies made of records,65 copying, phone
calls, postage, and travel not directly stemming from a deposition,66
appraisal fees by witnesses voluntarily selected by defendants,67 fees
assessed by banks to assemble records and appear to testify pursuant
to subpoena, 68 trial exhibit expenses, 69 and attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees. 70 The granting of expert witness fees has also been
curtailed under this line of cases,7 1 even though "witness fees" are now
explicitly stated as assessable in section 7A-305(d)(11). 72 Expert wit-
ness fees prior to the legislative 2007 amendments were construed to
not be assessable when the expert witnesses are the parties themselves,
632 S.E.2d at 210 (stating that because "[tlhe plain language of section 7A-305(d)
makes the items it sets forth 'assessable or recoverable[,]' . . . nothing in [that section]
requires a trial court to exercise its discretion under section 6-20 to award the items
listed in section 7A-305(d)").
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d) (2007).
62. See, e.g., infra discussion accompanying notes 76-77 (describing how even
"explicitly delineated" witness fees do not necessarily include all witness fees).
63. Priest, 663 S.E.2d at 354 ("Although Smith's statutory analysis leading to this
conclusion is sound, the greater weight of authority from this Court is that costs enu-
merated in [section] 7A-305(d) must be awarded to the prevailing party.").
64. Crist v. Crist, 550 S.E.2d 260, 266 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
65. Sealey v. Grine, 444 S.E.2d 632, 635 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
66. Muse ex rel. Muse v. Eckberg, 533 S.E.2d 268, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
67. Wade v. Wade, 325 S.E.2d 260, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
68. Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 500 S.E.2d 732, 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
69. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
786 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("We therefore decline to follow those opinions from this
Court which purport to make trial exhibit expenses taxable in the discretion of a trial
court.").
70. Id. at 785-86.
71. City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d 179, 186 (N.C. 1972).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d)(1) (2007).
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a result that seems to run contrary to the present language of section
7A-305(d).73
This approach's greatest strength is that it allows for consistency
in application, which seems fitting given that Article 28 of Chapter 7A
is titled "Uniform Costs and Fees in the Trial Divisions."74 It is based
on "paramount precedent"75 and does no "further violence to the plain
meaning of [the costs statutes]."76 Its greatest downside is that the
approach seems unable to adapt swiftly to change, as courts imple-
menting this approach are handcuffed in that they are only able to tax
costs according to the law as it currently stands, and those costs which
were assessable at common law. The problem surrounding what actu-
ally constitutes a common law cost is a difficult one for these courts to
solve. Do costs encompass those expenses allowed in cases that
adopted the "reasonable and necessary" reasoning, or are they solely
based on those costs assessable prior to the enactment of section 7A-
305?
IV. THE IMPACT
Having set forth the law as it stood and the two approaches that
have led to the problem surrounding costs in North Carolina, it is
important to discuss the most recent case law and legislative amend-
ments that have attempted to sort out the confusion. Section A will
focus on the leading supreme court case, City of Charlotte v. McNeely,77
discussing its impact on recent court of appeals opinions and the solu-
tion here proposed. Section B will involve a discussion of opinions
from the North Carolina Court of Appeals leading up to the 2007
amendment, while section C will discuss very briefly the landscape of
the opinions of the court of appeals after the amendment, as no court
has been faced directly with the new statute.78
73. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d at 186 ("Clearly, the legislature did not contemplate that a
party would disburse or become liable to himself for a fee when he testified as a wit-
ness for himself in his own case. Neither did it contemplate that a party would pay an
officer to subpoena himself as a witness. The losing party is taxed with the costs of
his adversary's witness only if the witness was subpoenaed and examined or
tendered.").
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-304 to -321 (emphasis added).
75. Smith v. Cregan, 632 S.E.2d 206, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
76. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
77. 190 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1972).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-305.
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A. The Supreme Court Speaks: City of Charlotte v. McNeely
The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the issue of what
constituted costs in 1972, taking steps to clarify the law as it then
stood.7 9 Justice Sharp (who later became Chief Justice) wrote the
McNeely opinion, and her words have been cited in almost every costs-
related case since. She began by stating several principles that should
be kept in mind whenever the issue of costs is raised before stating the
rule.80 First, at common law, no party in a civil suit was awarded
costs, and each had to pay for their own witnesses.81 Second, all costs
in the state are allowed pursuant to statute.8 2 She then went on to
declare that the rule in North Carolina is that "[c]osts in this state, are
entirely creatures of legislation, and without this they do not exist. "83
Justice Sharp continued, reasoning that according to these principles,
courts lack the ability to assess costs based solely on "mere equitable
or moral grounds.
8 4
It is easy to see why those courts that adhere to the "explicitly
delineated" approach garner so much support from this case.8 5 By
greatly circumscribing those costs which may be assessed, Justice
Sharp set forth the basis for courts to strictly construe even those costs
statutes enacted much later. In undertaking a detailed analysis of each
cost sought, Justice Sharp cited case-law and statutes (where applica-
ble) to either affirm, modify, or disallow those costs assessed (or not)
by the court of appeals.8 6 While the opinion and its analytical frame-
work is the starting point for many (indeed, most) opinions on costs, it
is important to take note that the case was decided before many of the
statutes that further muddled the area were enacted.
B. The Court of Appeals Cases- Pre-2007 Amendment
The cases from the North Carolina Court of Appeals that lead up
to the 2007 amendment and those after it give great insight into the
thought process of the court and the direction in which it has headed
regarding the issue of costs. In some of these cases, the court specifi-
cally chose to adopt one of the two lines, whereas in others, the reason-
79. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d at 179.
80. Id. at 185.
81. Id.; see Chadwick v. Life Ins. Co., 74 S.E. 115 (N.C. 1912).
82. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d at 185; see Costin v. Baxter, 29 N.C. 111, 112 (1846).
83. Id. (quoting Clerk's Office v. Comm'rs, 27 S.E. 1003 (N.C. 1897)).
84. Id. (quoting 20 CJ.S. COSTS §§ 1, 2 (1940)).
85. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586
S.E.2d 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
86. See McNeely, 190 S.E.2d at 184-88.
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ing behind the ultimate costs decision was less clear. Ultimately, each
case presented its court with the difficult task of choosing between two
reasonable options. As will be shown, however, most of these courts
seem to fall in line with the "explicitly delineated" approach outlined
above.
Coffman v. Roberson is one of the cases that leaves unclear which
line of interpretation North Carolina courts utilize, although the "rea-
sonable and necessary" line appears to be implicitly accepted by the
court of appeals."7 Dealing with several costs (some explicitly deline-
ated in the North Carolina General Statutes, others allowed by earlier
opinions),"8 Judge Tyson's opinion relied on a mixture of cases from
both of the aforementioned approaches without expressly mentioning
that he had done so.8 9 The opinion made guessing precisely which
approach the court of appeals would adopt in a given case more
arduous.
Less than a year later in Department of Transportation v. Charlotte
Area Manufactured Housing, Inc., the court of appeals, noting that its
cases "irreconcilably conflict" regarding the propriety of the assess-
ment of certain costs, made it clear that adopting the "explicitly deline-
ated" approach was the proper course of action for cost cases. 90 The
court supported this conclusion by undertaking a detailed comparison
of each approach and its respective supporting cases, 9' making the gui-
dance it provided on the subject all the more commanding.
87. 571 S.E.2d 255, 261-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("While case law has found that
deposition costs are allowable under section 6-20, it has in no way precluded the trial
court from taxing other costs that may be 'reasonable and necessary." (quoting Min-
ton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 513, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)).
88. Id. (addressing costs such as expert witness fees unrelated to the testimony
before the court, "court costs, mediation costs, deposition costs, expert fees and
expenses, witness mileage expenses, service of subpoenas, trial exhibits, and travel
expenses for hearings and trial" (citations omitted)).
89. Id. at 261 (citing "reasonable and necessary" cases (including Minton, 468
S.E.2d at 516 (relying on Alsup v. Pitman, 390 S.E.2d 750, 750-52 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990)) and Estate of Smith ex rel. Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 815 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1997)) and "explicitly delineated" cases (including Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 500
S.E.2d 732 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), and Sealey v. Grine, 444 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994))).
90. 586 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("We thus conclude that the cases
from this court irreconcilably conflict as to whether legislation permits the taxing of
items not listed in the North Carolina General Statutes as assessable or recoverable
costs. To resolve the present case, we must necessarily choose one approach .... We
choose to follow the 'explicitly delineated' approach . (citations omitted)).
91. Id.
140 [Vol. 32:127
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol32/iss1/5
2009] MURKY WATER: COURT COSTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 141
But on the very same day, the court of appeals decided Cosentino
v. Weeks. 92 Engaging in much the same discussion of the two
approaches as Charlotte Area Manufactured Housing, the court dis-
cussed the two types of discretion trial courts of the time had exer-
cised.93 The first was the discretion to determine whether costs
should be assessed at all in a given action-a discretion expressly
granted by statute.9 4 The second, more controversial use of discretion
was the kind exercised in awarding "non-statutory common law
costs."9 Without discussing in length the merits of the latter, the
court nonetheless reiterated other opinions have held a trial judge did
not abuse their discretion by granting some of the very costs at issue in
the case before them.96 Affirming the trial court, the court showed
itself unwilling to abandon the "reasonable and necessary" line of rea-
soning-reasoning that, on the very same day, it had chosen not to
follow in Charlotte Area Manufactured Housing. F Also important was
the court's analysis regarding whether the assessment of common law
costs were discretionary or mandatory. 98 In holding that common law
costs were to be treated as permissive, the court again cited from the
"reasonable and necessary" line of cases,99 failing yet again to act on
an opportunity to clarify the law.
In Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., Judge Steelman
explained that because copy and telephone expenses and deposition
and deposition related costs were not explicitly authorized by sec-
tion 7A-305(d), the refusal of a trial judge to allow these costs under
section 6-20 was not an abuse of discretion.'0 0 Regarding expert wit-
ness fees, the court cited the general rule that only those costs related
to experts subpoenaed to testify may be assessed, while too repeating
that costs are not assessable absent enabling legislation or a finding
92. 586 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
93. Id. at 790.
94. Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 212, sec. 3, § 7A-305(d), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 339,
339.
95. Cosentino, 586 S.E.2d at 790.
96. Id. (citing Coffman v. Roberson, 571 S.E.2d 255, 261-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002);
Lewis v. Setty, 537 S.E.2d 505, 507-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Sealey v. Grine, 444
S.E.2d 632, 635 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
97. Id. at 791.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 789, 791 (citing Coffman, 571 S.E.2d at 261-62; Lewis, 537 S.E.2d at
507-08; Alsup v. Pitman, 390 S.E.2d 750, 750-52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)).
100. Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 596 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004).
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they encompass common law costs.10 1 As to the fees of mediators, it
was held that the trial court's refusal to assess the costs associated
with mediation was error. 102 In all of this, there was no mention of the
two competing approaches. However, the opinion delineated the
proper analysis for cost cases that has been frequently cited by later
panels of the court of appeals, many of which cite Lord as failing to
follow the "paramount precedent" established by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in McNeely.
10 3
After Lord, two cases appeared to have implicitly adopted the
"explicitly delineated" approach as the preferred method of analysis.
Morgan v. Steiner'1 4 and Smith v. Cregan'05 both relied on the two situ-
ations in which costs may be assessed: pursuant to statute and those
defined as common law costs. Morgan involved the straightforward
application of the "explicitly delineated" line, discussing (among other
costs) numerous expert witnesses subpoenaed to testify to the same
material fact, and the court relied heavily on the application of section
7A-314(e). 10 6 Smith once again discussed the divergent lines the court
of appeals had taken in the past during its discussion of expert witness
fees, stating that it had, in some cases, "[r]egrettably" failed to heed the
supreme court's words in McNeely. 10 7 The court ultimately held that
section 6-20 did not require a court to exercise its discretion as per-
tains to those costs enumerated in section 7A-305(d), especially in
light of the fact that the party seeking costs never received a judgment
(as required under section 6-1).1"8
C. The Reaction: Court of Appeals Cases Following the 2007
Amendment
Most of the cases the North Carolina Court of Appeals has dealt
with in the wake of the 2007 amendments, discussed in Part II above,
101. Id.
102. Id. at 896.
103. Smith v. Cregan, 632 S.E.2d 206, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (comparing Dep't
of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003) (adhering to City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 190 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1972)), with
Lord, 596 S.E.2d 891 (departing from McNeely)).
104. 619 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
105. 632 S.E.2d 206 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
106. Morgan, 619 S.E.2d at 519-22 (discussing deposition costs, costs for obtaining
medical records, medication costs, cumulative expert witnesses, and trial exhibit fees).
107. Smith, 632 S.E.2d at 211 (holding certain expert witness fees not assessable in
a negligence action and lamenting that "[r]egrettably, panels of this Court have dif-
fered in their willingness to apply the Supreme Court's directive").
108. Id. at 210-11,
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have nevertheless been handled under the old statute, as their claims
arose before the amendments went into effect on August 1, 2007.'0 9
We have very little insight into what a court will do in light of the
legislative changes, as we are only able to look at the court of appeals'
treatment of the issue just before the amendment for guidance. This in
itself is another reason why it is very important for the North Carolina
Supreme Court to take a case that incorporates the new law, and
announce a clear rule for handing the costs question. Doing so will
enable litigants to budget their litigation expenditures more strategi-
cally, and will provide necessary guidance to lower courts so the costs
problem does not simply repeat itself.
V. THE DECISION
The best answer to the costs problem involves accepting the ratio-
nale of those courts that utilize the "explicitly delineated" approach,
due in large part to the plain meaning of the controlling statutes. As
stated, the costs listed in the amended version of section 7A-305(d) are
meant to be "complete and exclusive," and our look into the history
surrounding this statute only furthers this interpretation." Taking
into consideration recent opinions of the court of appeals and legisla-
tive amendments, the best way to deal with the costs that have been
granted using the "reasonable and necessary" approach is to disallow
those which were not assessable by law prior to 1983 (when section
7A-320 was enacted), or those which the "greater weight of authority"
have established are not common law costs.11' Furthermore, under
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, a statute that lists
items to which it applies inherently excludes those not encompassed in
its listing, as section 7A-305(d) clearly does." 2
The "explicitly delineated" approach provides not only a level of
flexibility for courts, but also sufficient guidelines and options that
will likely make our system more consistent in the assessment of costs.
As Judge Levinson stated in Charlotte Area Manufactured Housing after
an in-depth analysis of both approaches, "to follow the 'reasonable and
109. Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 663 S.E.2d 351, 352 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
("We note that the legislature amended [sections] 6-20 and 7A-305(d), effective I
August 2007 .... However, plaintiffs brought their motion for recovery of costs on 5
January 2007, under the old version of the statutes.").
110. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text (describing the history of and
changes to certain "costs" statutes).
111. See, e.g., Bennett v. Equity Residential, 665 S.E.2d 514, 517 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
112. Evans v. Diaz, 430 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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necessary' approach would do further violence to the plain meaning of
[sections] 6-1, 6-20, and 7A-320 and further erode the general rule that
non-statutory costs are not taxable."' 3 The reasoning of the "explic-
itly delineated" rule is also more in-tune with the precedent of the
supreme court 1 4 and the recent opinions of the court of appeals. 1 5 It
is therefore the best option to promote uniformity in application.
VI. THE SOLUTION
The uncertainty surrounding the law of court costs in North Car-
olina is something that can be easily solved by our supreme court with
a definitive statement regarding how the statutes shall be applied,
which line of reasoning to utilize, and the extent of the trial judge's
discretion. Adopting either the "reasonable and necessary" or the
"explicitly delineated" approach will not only simplify our costs juris-
prudence, but will also afford our citizens (and their attorneys) gui-
dance by which to gauge their expectations as they proceed to court.
Becoming involved in a lawsuit is a scary enough experience for many
even without the uncertainty that our law creates regarding those costs
a party may have to pay even after the conclusion of the suit.
After our high court makes a decision clarifying the law of costs,
the doctrine of stare decisis will take hold, providing a guide for other
courts in North Carolina and for attorneys as they prepare for trial." 6
The recent post-amendment opinions of our court of appeals" 7
(which seem to adopt the reasoning of the explicitly delineated
113. Dep't of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Hous., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 780,
785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("We choose to follow the "explicitly delineated" approach
because this approach is premised upon an interpretation of [section] 6-20 which is
more consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that costs are creatures of
statute.").
114. Id. at 786 ("Without question, this Court is required to follow decisions of our
Supreme Court until the Supreme Court orders otherwise." (citing Heatherly v. Indus.
Health Council, 504 S.E.2d 102, 106 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998))).
115. Id. ("This panel also is required to follow precedent established by prior panels
of this court. However, where an opinion from this Court has been inconsistent with
prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court, we have declined to follow
it."(citations omitted)); see Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36
(N.C. 1989); Heatherly, 504 S.E.2d at 106.
116. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("We should not be so unmindful, even when constitutional questions are involved, of
the principle of stare decisis, by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this
Court as an institution transcending the moment can alone be brought to bear on the
difficult problems that confront us.").
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-36 (discussing the post-2007
amendments).
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approach) can be conclusively endorsed by our supreme court if it
adjudicates a case dealing with the issue, and therefore this question
that has befuddled many will hopefully be resolved. After this action is
taken, the law of costs will no longer present "a fork in the road" as it
has for so many years, and North Carolinians can plan their day in
court with consistency and clarity.
James Edwin Griffin, III
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